Geospatial Coverage Patterns of Banking Strategic Groups in Venezuela by Flores Márquez, Sandra Lizbeth et al.
International Joint Conference - CIO-ICIEOM-IIE-AIM (IJC 2016)  
San Sebastián, Spain, July 13-15, 2016 
 
Geospatial Coverage Patterns of Banking 
Strategic Groups in Venezuela  
Flores Márquez S1, Rodríguez-Monroy C2, Peláez-García MA3
 
Abstract The objective of this research is to determine the Patterns of Geospatial 
Coverage (PGC) of Strategic Groups (SGs) in the Venezuelan banking sector. In 
order to achieve this objective three years (2008-2010) characterized by financial 
instability were considered. Variables of the two dimensions: Scope of the Strate-
gy and Committed Resources, already used by other authors, were considered in 
this research. The results indicate that, at least in Venezuela, banking sector SGs 
adopt a geographic coverage strategy consistent with their strategy of scope and 
commitment of resources.  
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1 Venezuelan Banks, Strategic Groups and Geographic 
Coverage  
This section briefly describes the most important features of the Venezuelan 
banking industry as well as part of the theory of strategic groups and geographic 
coverage.  
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1.1 The Venezuelan Banking System  
As of 2004, the credit portfolio of the Venezuelan banking system experienced a 
rapid growth influenced by the increase in prices of the barrel of oil and, as a 
consequence, due to the increase of public deposits in banks. 
Then, in late 2008 a financial crisis that led to the bankruptcy and intervention 
of 21 banks (Sudeban, 2013) within three years starts. In most cases, interventions 
occurred as a con-sequence of irregularities that were occurring in institutions. 
However, authors like Bernardette et al. (2007) had pointed to the fragility of the 
Venezuelan banking system, for several reasons: 1) The abrupt growth of public 
deposits led to the allocation of a greater number of credits, with the result of de-
linquent portfolios. 2) Higher purchases of securities of the National Public Debt 
and Treasury increased the vulnerability of the system. 3) The exchange control 
that keeps Venezuela since 2003 and inflation led to lower availability of re-
sources for intermediation by the banking system. 4) The regulation of interest 
rates negative effect on financial margins. 
Public banks benefited from these interventions, as the Bicentennial Bank, the 
Treasury and the Bank of Venezuela acquired several private financial institutions, 
already liquidated, which led to a rapid increase in the banking network of the 
state. 
1.2 Strategic Groups and Geographic Coverage   
In the context of the dimensions used in this research, Cool and Schendel (1987) 
define SGs a set of companies competing within an industry which have similar 
combinations of scope and committed resources. 
    One of the important aspects of the analysis of GE, for some authors, is that 
possible to determine a priori the level of performance achieved by a company 
that is located within a certain GE (McNamara et al., 2003). By contrast, other 
researchers found no significant differences in performance between the groups 
obtained and therefore deny the predictive validity of GE or have only achieved 
partial evidence of this theory. The level of performance of a group may depend 
on the territory in which it is located (Canina et al., 2005), so the banks tend to 
locate their offices in the regions with greater economic development, better 
education and greater reliance on formal economy, in contrast to the population 
that does not have banking services; so poor citizens constitute the vast majority 
of those excluded from the financial system (Marulanda and Paredes, 2006, p. 33) 
     Porter (1985, p. 146) suggested that the geographical coverage (GC) is one of 
the indicators of the scope of the strategy, one of the two dimensions for analysis 
of SGs, so this indicator represents a barrier to mobility between strategic groups. 
The GC has been measured in studies of banking or other sectors of the economy 
detecting the location of offices in territorial units like districts, metropolitan areas 
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or countries (Blanas et al., 2012). In this research, in addition to estimating the 
number of branches by municipalities in each SG, they are represented in a 
geographic information system (GIS) to discover patterns of geospatial coverage 
(PGC) of bank SGs, aspect not addressed from this perspective in previous 
research on SGs and whose most important theoretical implications are: 1) to 
establish that SGs follow PGC consistent with their outreach strategies and 
commitment of resources, in line with the claim that competitive advantage can 
come from an external source such as location of the company, a factor that has 
been neglected in the literature (Porter and Kramer, 2011) and 2) public and 
private banks differ in their PGC in accordance with their social and economic 
goals. 
2 Data and Study Variables  
Initially all the banks that existed in Venezuela in 2008, 2009 and 2010 were 
considered. This was a period characterized by strong financial instability. 
Subsequently, the institutions which did not publish their financial statements in 
the Banking Association of Venezuela were excluded, since only those banks 
which publish the financial statements provide the information needed to assess 
the constitution of the loan portfolio. Similarly, banks with atypical values in any 
of the variables of the scope dimension of the strategy or of committed resources 
were discarded. Therefore, the sample was made as follows: For the year 2008 by 
58 financial institutions, for 2009 by 52 banks and for 2010 by 39 institutions. In 
order to define the SGs the variables proposed by Flores et al. (2015) were used.  
3 Methodology 
To determine the number of suitable SGs the procedure described by Flores et al. 
(2015) was followed, obtaining the same factors and the same number of SGs. 
Similarly, to identify the strategy and resource commitment that distinguish one 
group from another the procedure proposed by Flores et al. (2015) was used in the 
first place being then complemented by the one suggested by Amel and Rhoades 
(1988), but only when the SGs were composed of only two individuals, due to the 
loss of statistical power. 
The procedure proposed by Flores et al. (2015) has the following advantages over 
the algorithm of Amel and Rhoades (1988): 1) Greater objectivity to determine 
strategic sector variables for a particular period, 2) It establishes differences 
between SGs objectively, 3) It enables the identification probable gradations in the 
behavior of SGs with respect to a particular variable and therefore allows a better 
understanding of the specialization of extra-group competitors and, 4) The hybrid 
behavior of SGs is demonstrated unequivocally with the post hoc tests applied. 
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On the other hand, in order to assess the PGC the number of offices in each SG 
was registered in a GIS containing information on the limits of the 335 
municipalities of Venezuela. The Spearman Rho test was used to analyze the 
coverage of GE in the municipalities classified according to their degree of 
investment attractiveness. To determine the geographical coverage the number of 
municipalities in which at least one office is located, as well as the population 
density (INE, 2011), the attractiveness to invest and the poverty rank of these 
municipalities were considered (Roche et al., 2002; ECLAC-UNICEF, 2006; 
CONAPRI, 2009, 2011). 
4 SGs Obtained and their Geographic Coverage  
4.1 SG1: Retail banking  
In the years 2008 and 2009 its asset strategy was very risky, since 45% of its loan 
portfolio did not have any collateral, but was efficient in evaluating the risk asso-
ciated with this portfolio. On the other hand, it captured its liabilities through cur-
rent accounts and showed the largest banking network of all SGs. Its geographical 
coverage was 51.6%, because it covered 173 out of the 335 municipalities in the 
country. It excluded the less populated municipalities of Venezuela and eight of 
the poorest (Figure 1). Geographically it included the less poor municipalities and 
those where it was most attractive to invest in, centralizing in these 22 municipali-
ties 59% of its offices, 70% of its ATMs and 59% of its auto-banks. In the latter 
aspect, the more attractive the municipality was the higher number of auto-banks 
that were located in the municipality (rs p <0.05). It excluded some of the less 
populated municipalities in Venezuela and eight of the poorest (Figure 1). 
    In 2010 SG1 remained aggressive in its asset strategy and conservative in the 
selection of the geographic market. So the SG1 positioned its large banking net-
work in municipalities with greater economic development, and therefore higher 
profitability. This PGC enables the SG1, which gives a high percentage of unse-
cured loans: 1) To reduce the costs and risks associated with poorer regions 
(Mendizabal et al, 2008, p 214), 2) To be efficient in risk assessment of the loan 
portfolio. 
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Fig 1. Geographic Coverage of the SGs (year 2008), as a function of poverty, population density 
and attractiveness to invest by municipality.  
4.2 SG2: Microenterprise  banking  
In 2008 it specialized in loan portfolio aimed at micro-entrepreneurs in the formal 
economy. It showed a very small banking network with 12.5% geographical 
coverage. It established  61% offices, 50% of its ATMs and 70% of its auto-banks 
in t six of the least poor municipalities in Venezuela and in twelve of the most 
attractive to invest (Figure 1). This hedging strategy is consistent with its financial 
strategy, as it is in these municipalities where the bank generally gives the largest 
volume of loans to micro-entrepreneurs (Melandri, 2006), which is essential for its 
specialized strategy of offering products and services to microenterprises. 
In 2009, although the SG2 was dedicated to the securities portfolio and no longer 
specialized in the loan portfolio, loans continued flowing towards micro-
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entrepreneurs, encompassing 35 municipalities in which it granted 70% of the 
total loans for micro-entrepreneurs from the whole Venezuelan banking system 
(SUDEBAN, 2011, pp. 90-96). In 2010 SG2 again implemented the same active 
strategy as in 2008, maintaining its hedging strategy focused on micro-
entrepreneurs. 
4.3 SG3: Small corporate banking  
During the three years under study, each bank of this SE had only one office in 
Venezuela, and no tellers or auto-banks and oriented, more intensely than other 
groups to interbank loans. In the years 2008 and 2009 it completely avoided 
placing funds in the credit portfolio and getting money through current accounts, 
savings and term deposits. In 2010 it did not totally sidestepped these assets and 
liabilities strategies. 
Its geographical coverage was only 0.6%. However, for this SG it is not necessary 
to expand geographically to execute its unique strategy of interbank transactions, 
or to own ATMs or auto-banks, but its location in the contiguous municipalities of 
Chacao and Libertador is really important, because it is  here where the financial 
district of the country is located. 
 
4.4 SG4: Corporate public banks  
During the 2008-2010 period it was mainly oriented to the securities portfolio, 
bringing financial services to its customers through a moderate banking network. 
In 2008 it showed the highest geographical coverage of all SGs (61.5%) but had 
only 32% of the branch network of the largest group (SG5). Its banking network 
included three of the least populated municipalities of Venezuela and six of the 
poorest (Figure 1) In addition, the average population in which it located at least 
one office was the lowest of all SGs. Although it included eight of the less poor 
and the most attractive to invest municipalities, it did not do it aggressively, as it  
only concentrated on them 43% of its branches, 43% of its ATMs and 26% of its 
auto-banks. So the strategy of geographical coverage of SG4 is not to concentrate 
its banking network in municipalities with greater economic development but 
rather to distribute them to the greatest number of municipalities, including some 
of the most depopulated and the poorest, demonstrating the social focus of public 
banks. This PGC was maintained in 2009 and 2010. 
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4.5 SG5: High risk banks specialized in domestic economies 
The GE 5 had an outreach strategy, commitment of resources and geographical 
coverage similar to those of SG1 during the 2008-2009 period. It was a very risky 
banking strategy for three reasons: 1) The investment in the loan portfolio 
increased risk and operating costs compared to other strategies for assets, 2) It 
obtained resources through savings accounts and term deposits, which in 
Venezuela are much more expensive liabilities collection instruments than current 
accounts, 3) It showed a high financial leverage. However, the risk assumed in 
their financial strategies decreased due to: 1) Aggressively positioning its large 
banking network in select geographic markets, represented by the less poor and 
the most attractive to invest (Figure 1) municipalities, since it concentrated the 
largest network of branches (59%) in those municipalities compared to other SG 
and 2) It excluded less populated municipalities and the poorest.  
In 2010 the SG5 was aimed at interbank operations. It maintained its liabilities 
and borrowing strategy and showed a greatly diminished bank network due to 
bankruptcies of some of its banks and the migration of other entities to the SG1. In 
this year its small banking network covered only 1.5% of the municipalities in 
Venezuela, specifically Chacao, which is one of the less poor municipalities of 
Venezuela and Libertador (Federal District), Valencia, Maracaibo and Sotillo, 
which are among the most attractive for investment, centralizing in these five mu-
nicipalities 100% of its banking network. Therefore, SG5 was quite conservative 
when selecting its geographic market because it was located in areas with greater 
economic weight and its location in the Chacao and Libertador municipalites is es-
sential for the implementation of its asset strategy, since it is here where the coun-
try’s financial district is located. 
5 Conclusions 
According to the results of this research, at least in Venezuela, the SGs tend to be 
located in certain geographical areas (municipalities) in accordance with the 
implementation of their scope strategies and the commitment of resources. 
Therefore, the financial strategy is closely related to the strategy of geographical 
coverage, of which two basic patterns were detected: a strategy of concentration 
implemented by most private banking groups, which tend to focus on the 
geographic markets which are the most attractive to invest, which implies less risk 
and cost for the financial institutions, and a strategy of dispersion which is 
practiced by public banks that tends to cover more territories (municipalities) with 
a network of offices which is smaller than its private counterpart, Hence, it is 
better suited to the new principles of corporate social responsibility of banks that 
promote the fight against geographic financial exclusion (De los Rios et al., 2012), 
since it also operates in several of the less populated and poorest municipalities in 
the country. The information on the Patterns of Geographic Coverage enable bank 
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managers to explore possible new markets which have been excluded from the 
financial system and it also allows government officials to implement public 
policies to include those segments of the population which are not taken care by 
the financial system. 
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